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THE SPORT OF NUMBERS: MANIPULATING TITLE IX TO 
RATIONALIZE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is one of the most 
important pieces of federal legislation passed to exclude sex 
discrimination from all educational forums and promote equality for 
girls and women. 1 Most notably Title IX is known for its advancements 
in female athletics by requiring "members of both sexes to have equal 
opportunities to participate in sports and receive the benefits of 
competitive athletics."2 Furthermore, Title IX requires athletic 
scholarships, benefits, and opportunities to be allocated equitably and it 
requires effective accommodation of student interests and abilities. 3 
On June 27, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Education 
("OED"), Rodney Paige, created the Commission on Opportunities in 
Athletics ("Commission") in recognition of Title IX's thirtieth 
anniversary.4 The purpose of the Commission was to "collect 
information, analyze issues, and obtain broad public input directed at 
improving the application of current Federal standards for measuring 
equal opportunity for men, women, boys and girls to participate in 
athletics under Title IX."5 After eight months of review, the Commission 
suggested approximately twenty-three recommendations for Title IX 
reform" in a report entitled "Open to All: Title IX at Thirty." 
Many of the recommendations in the report are targeted at achieving 
serious changes in how athletics departments comply with Title IX; and 
1. 20 U.S.C. § 16Hl (2002). 
2. National Women's Law Center, The Battlcf(n Gender Equity in Athletics: Title IX at Thirty 
1 <http:/ I www. n wlc.org/ pdf/ Battle%20f(Jr%20C ;ender%20 Equi ty%20in %20A thletics%20Report. pdf> 
(June 2002) [hereinafter NWLC Battle]. 
3. 44 Fed. Reg. 71413-71423 (Dec. 11, 1979) (Policy interpretation offered by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare regarding intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title 
!X of the Education Amendments of 1972 and its implementing regulations.). 
4. U.S. Department of Education, "Open to All:" Title IX at Thirty, The Secretary of 
Educatim1's Commissi<m on Opportunity in Athletics, 1 <http://www.cd.gov/pub/titleixat30/title9_ 
report. pdf> (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Commission RejJort]. 
5. I d. at 46. 
6. /d. all. 
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more significantly, some recommendations "reduce the [athletic] 
opportunities and scholarships to which women and girls are entitled 
under the law."7 A three-part compliance test established in 1979 offers 
institutions three independent ways to show that they are providing 
equal athletic opportunities to their male and female students.x However, 
many of the Commission's recommendations manipulate the ways in 
which schools count athletic participation by men and women under that 
three-part test. 9 In essence, some of these recommendations dilute the 
impact and significance of each of the prongs of the test at the cost of 
female participation. Title IX' s purpose is to prevent discrimination 
against women in educational forums, but by diluting Title IX's mandate, 
the Commission is justifying and rationalizing on-going discrimination 
against women. 
In response to the Commission's report, the DED issued a letter on 
July 11, 2003, entitled, Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance. 10 In the letter, the DED 
recognized that discrimination against female athletes still exists and 
must be addressed by aggressive enforcement of Title IX. 11 In addition, 
the DED stated that it would undertake a campaign to help educational 
institutions better understand the three-part compliance test and work 
consistently with institutions in implementing Title IX. 12 Ironically, the 
DED did not comment on the Commission's recommendations. The 
DED could adopt any of these recommendations in the future, which in 
turn, could adversely affect athletic opportunities for women and girls. 
This paper will analyze the Commission's recommendations aimed 
at lowering the level of compliance required to satisfy the current three-
part test. Part II of this paper will explore the creation and enactment of 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Part III will survey the 
expansion of Title IX protection to include athletic opportunities, and 
how such expansion has been interpreted by the courts and the DED. 
Part IV will explore the creation and mandate of the Secretary of 
Education's Commission on Opportunity in Athletics. Part V will 
critically analyze the Commission's recommendations against the current 
7. National Women's l.aw Center, Title IX Commission's Drafi Report Ignores Continuing 
Discrimination Against Women & Girls, Says NWLC <http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm'id= 1310 
&section=newsroom> (February 20, 2003) [hercinafier NWLC Draji Report Ignores]. 
8. 44Fed. Reg. 71418(Dec.ll, 1979). 
9. See Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 33-40. 
10. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, 
Further Clart(ication of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance 
<http:/ /www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/title'JguidanccFinal.html> (July II, 2003). 
II. !d. 
12. hi. 
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legal backdrop of Title IX, focusing on specific recommendations which, 
if adopted, will directly contravene standing case law precedents. 
Specifically, Part V will address the positive federal appellate court 
treatment of the current Title IX policies, the likelihood that certain 
changes to such policies would be judicially overturned, and the 
inconsistency of these recommendations with current DED policies and 
Title IX itself. 
In particular, Section A of Part V will address Commission 
recommendations that allow institutions to creatively count student 
enrollment and athletic participation in order to maintain enrollment-to-
athletics ratios that meet the first test of compliance-substantial 
proportionality. However, as will be shown, such creative counting 
would actually mask the ongoing sex discrimination against women in 
athletics. Section B will investigate two recommendations that would 
permit institutions to perform interest surveys to demonstrate that the 
institution has satisfied the third test of compliance by fully and 
effectively accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex. 
Part VI will conclude the paper by addressing current Title IX policies 
that effectively promote both men's and women's athletics and should 
properly remain intact and be vigorously enforced. 
II. THE BIRTH OF TITLE IX 
Prior to the adoption of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, many colleges and universities discriminated against female 
students in a number of educational aspects. 13 One key forum of 
discrimination was athletics. 14 Many women were not only denied 
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics, but were also 
denied the significant benefits of athletic scholarships. 15 In the late 1960s, 
Congress began to examine these disparities by investigating educational 
institutions and their discriminatory policies against women. 16 The 
House Special Subcommittee on Education held extensive hearings in 
1970 and found "massive, persistent patterns of discrimination against 
women in the academic world." 17 Congress passed the Title IX bill as a 
remedy and President Richard Nixon signed it into law on June 23, 
U. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972). In 1972, women represented fewer than 30,000 college and 
fewer than 300,000 high school athletic participants. In contrast, men represented approximately 
170,000 college and 3.6 million high school athletes. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 5. 
14. Cohen v. Brown U., 991 f.2d 888,894 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cohen I]. 
15. /d. 
IIi. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 14. 
17. 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972). 
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1972. 18 
Title IX prohibits federally funded education programs and activities 
from engaging in sex discrimination. 19 "Title IX's prohibitions against 
sex discrimination are broad and its mandate applies to all educational 
activities"20 and all levels of education that receive federal funding-from 
elementary schools to universities. 21 Title IX was passed with two key 
objectives: "to avoid the use of federal resources to support 
discriminatory practices;" and "to provide individual citizens effective 
protection against those practices."22 To accomplish these goals, 
Congress directed all federal agencies extending financial assistance to 
educational institutions to develop procedures for terminating financial 
assistance to institutions that violated Title IX.23 
III. LEGAL HISTORY AND STATUTORY AMENDMENTS 
To further the successful administration of Title IX, Congress 
approved the Javits amendment in 1974, which required the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"),24 through its Office of Civil 
Rights ("OCR"), to promulgate regulations for determining compliance 
with Title IX. 25 
In 1975, OCR issued its first set of regulations to provide guidance to 
18. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 14. 
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."). 
20. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) [hereinafter 
CRRA]. CRRA is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). CRRA directly overturned Grove City v. Bell, 
465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984), which held that Title IX did not apply to an entire institution, but rather 
only to those departments that directly received federal funds. 
21. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 3. However, there are several statutory exclusions from Title 
IX including religious and military institutions. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(3)-(a)(4). 
22. Cannon v. U. of Chi., 441 U.S 677, 704 (1979) (where the Court interpreted the objectives 
of Title IX, citing to comments in the Congressional Record as support for its interpretations). 
23. 20 u.s.c. § 1682 (2002). 
24. "[I]n 1979, Congress split HEW into the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and the Department of Education (DED)." Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895 (citation omitted). The 
existing Title IX regulations "were left within HHS's arsenal while ... DED replicated them as part of 
its own regulatory armamentarium." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, DED is the principle agency 
of policy enforcement. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(l) (2002) (transferring all education fuuctions 
of HEW to DED) and 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (2002) (transferring education-related Office of Civil 
Rights work to DED)). Notably, HHS's and DED's regulations are identical except for the change in 
language necessitated by splitting HEW into HHS and DED. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 895. 
25. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 15. See Cohen v. Brown U., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (lst Cir. 
1996) [hereinafter Cohen II] (discussing the scope of Title IX and effect on university's athletics 
programs). In addition, in 1974, Congress rejected the Tower Amendment, which would have 
excluded revenue-producing sports from Title IX jurisdiction. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 15. 
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university athletic programs on how to interpret Title IXY' These 
regulations made it clear that gender discrimination in intercollegiate 
athletics was a violation of Title IXY A section entitled, "Equal 
Opportunity," explained that a recipient of federal funding must 
"provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes."28 To 
determine whether universities were providing equal opportunities under 
Title IX, the Director of HEW was to consider specific factors, including: 
( l) whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively 
accommodate[ d) the interests and abilities of members of both sexes; 
(2) the provision of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games 
and practice time; ( 4) travel and per diem allowance; (5) opportunity to 
receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) assignment and 
compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of locker rooms, 
practice and competitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training 
facilities and services; (9) provision of housing and dining facilities and 
services; [and] (lO) publicity.29 
HEW further explained that unequal expenditures for men's and 
women's teams would not necessarily constitute a violation of this 
section, but that the Secretary could consider such factors in his or her 
overall assessment of equality. 311 In this set of regulations, HEW focused 
on compliance through equal opportunity instead of compliance through 
equal expenditure.ll 
In 1978, in response to more than fifty university discrimination 
complaints, HEW issued a set of proposed "Policy Interpretations" to 
clarify the obligations of federal aid recipients under Title IX. 32 The 
Policy Interpretation was promulgated in final form in 197933 and 
provided three areas of interests in determining compliance: (1) Athletic 
Financial Assistance (Scholarships); (2) Equivalence in Other Athletic 
Benefits and Opportunities; and (3) Effective Accommodation of Student 
Interests and Abilities. 34 In the second section of the Policy 
Interpretations, the regulations listed the above non-exhaustive list of 
26. U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Reading Room, Sex 
Discrimination/Title IX, 1975 Memorandum to Chief State School Officers <http:/ /www.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/ docs/holmes.html> (Nov. 11, 1975). 
27. 34 CF.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41 (2000). 
28. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2000). 
29. 34 C.F.R at§ 106.41(c)(1 )-(10). 
30. 34 C.F.R. at 106.41(c). 
31. Megan K. Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting 
Chance?, R Viii. Sports & Ent. L.). 1R9, 193 (2001). 
32. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 166. 
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 71413,71413-71423 (Dec. 11, 1979). 
34. /d.at714l3. 
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factors to be considered in determining whether equal opportunities are 
available to both genders.35 Of utmost importance is the third section, 
which establishes the "effective accommodation" test.3" This test states 
that compliance under Title IX depends on an affirmative response to 
one of the following three questions: 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male 
and female students are provided in numbers substantially 
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented 
among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a 
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is 
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the 
members of that sex; or 
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing 
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can 
be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that 
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present 
program.37 
After the Policy Interpretations were issued, the United States 
Supreme Court interpreted the language and intent of the regulations in 
a number of its decisions, adding another dimension to Title IX's 
enforcement. 3x In a non-athletic suit, the Supreme Court held in Cannon 
v. University of Chicago39 that Title IX provides an implicit right of action 
for an individual affected by a violation of Title IX.40 In Cannon, a female 
petitioner brought suit under Title IX after she was denied medical 
school admission at two private universities, alleging that these schools 
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. 41 The Court noted that the 
language of Title IX "does not ... expressly authorize a private right of 
action by a person injured by [such] a violation."42 Nonetheless, the 
Court engaged in a lengthy analysis to determine whether it was 
35. ld. at 71417. 
36. Id. at 71418. 
37. ld. 
38. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (stating there is an individual right of action under Title IX); 
Grove City, 465 U.S. at 573 (holding that Title IX only applied to specific departments receiving 
Federal financial assistance); and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. S(hs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (I 9'!2) 
(asserting that a private party could collect money damages under Title IX). 
39. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677-749. 
40. /d.at717. 
41. /d. at 680. 
42. I d. at 683. 
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Congress's intent to provide a special class of litigants with a private 
action remedy.41 Overall, the Court held that Title IX was patterned after 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which courts have found to 
provide a private remedy.44 The Court noted in conclusion that private 
rights are best created by Congress, but also recognized that in limited 
circumstances, Congress's failure to do so "is not inconsistent with an 
intent ... to have such remedy available .... "45 Thus, the Court's 
decision allowed educational institutions to be sued in court by private 
parties, rather than only being subject to investigation by OCR.46 
In 1984, there was some uncertainty as to whether Title IX applied 
only to the specific program receiving federal funding or to the entire 
educational institution. The Supreme Court resolved the issue in Grove 
City College v. Bell,47 by narrowly holding that Title IX only applied to the 
particular department receiving the federal financial assistance, and not 
to the entire institution. 4H The two significant issues presented in Grove 
City were (1) whether Title IX applied to Grove City College through 
indirect federal grants used by students to finance their education and, if 
so, (2) whether the federal assistance to that program could be 
terminated because the college refused to comply with Title IX.49 
First, the Court found that Title IX did not distinguish between 
direct institutional assistance and aid received by the school through its 
students. 50 The Court, considering clear statutory language and 
Congressional intent, construed the phrase "receiving Federal financial 
assistance" to include both direct and indirect methods of assistance. 5 1 
The Court then analyzed whether any particular educational 
43. /d. at 688-·710 (The four factors the Court considered were(!) "whether the statute was 
enacted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member[;]" (2) whether "legislative 
history ... expressly create[d] or den[ied] a private remedy ... [;]" (3) whether "a private remedy 
should not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme[;]" and 
( 4) "whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area 
basically of concern to the States."). 
44. /d. at 702. 
45. /d. at 717. 
46. /d. 
47. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 555. 
48. /d. at 573. 
49. /d. at 558. The Court considered a third issue, whether applying Title IX to Grove City 
infringes on the First Amendment rights of the college or its students. /d. On this particular issue, 
the Court concluded that Congress has the ability to "attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions 
to federal fina1o1cial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept." /d. at 575. 
Therefore, Grove City and its students can either accept the federal grants with the requirements or 
they can decline the usc of the federal grants and not be subjected to such requirements. I d. 
50. /d. at 564. 
51. /d. at 569. 
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program or activity of the college could be characterized as "receiving" 
federal assistance through grants of its students. 52 The fact that federal 
funds eventually reached the College's general operating budget was not 
enough to subject the entire College to Title IX compliance. 53 Rather the 
Court held that when federal assistance is earmarked to the recipient's 
financial aid program, the particular department or activity must meet 
Title IX compliance, not the entire institution. 54 However, few athletic 
departments receive federal funds directly, so this ruling essentially 
removed nearly every university's athletic program from the scope of 
Title IX. 
Congress responded to Grove City by adopting the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987 ("CRRA").55 In its findings, Congress asserted 
that recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court impermissibly 
narrowed the broad application of Title IX. 56 Congress passed the CRRA 
to "restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch 
interpretation and broad, institution-wide application of those laws as 
previously administered."57 Regarding the Education Amendments, the 
Act states that Title IX applies to "all of the operations" of an educational 
institution, "any part of which is extended federal financial assistance."58 
Congress thereby reinstated Title IX's broad interpretation by clarifying 
that all programs at an educational institution receiving federal funding 
fall under the jurisdiction of OCR. 
The Supreme Court further expanded the reach of Title IX's 
enforcement in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 59 Christine 
Franklin, a student at North Gwinnett High School, brought a suit 
alleging that the administration knowingly took no action to halt the 
continual sexual harassment she received from Andrew Hill, a teacher 
and coach employed by the district."0 The United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the case and the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by stating that monetary 
damages could not be sustained for an alleged intentional violation of 
Title IX. 61 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 572. 
54. Id.at573-74. 
55. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Act, as amended, is codified at 20 U.S.C: 
§ 1687 (1994). 
56. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28. 
57. Jd. 
58. 20 u.s.c. § 1687(4). 
59. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 60. 
60. I d. at 63-64. 
6 L I d. at 64-65. 
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that a private party could collect money damages in a Title IX lawsuit.62 
The Court relied on Cannon v. University of Chicago, which held that 
Title IX is enforceable through an implied right63 and the general 
common law rule that "where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded."64 Even 
though the Legislature that passed Title IX did not specify a remedy, the 
Court analyzed the state of the law at the time of enactment and 
concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the remedies available in 
a Title IX suit.65 In so doing, the Court significantly broadened Title IX's 
enforcement by allowing a damages remedy for an action to enforce Title 
IX.66 
In addition to the Supreme Court's interpretations of Title IX, other 
bodies have contributed to the understanding of Title IX. In 1990, OCR 
published the Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual to help aid in Title 
IX investigations of intercollegiate and interscholastic athletic 
programs.67 The manual is based on the 1979 Policy Interpretations and 
outlines general areas of compliance, scholarship, other athletic benefits 
and opportunities, and the effective accommodation of students. 68 
Furthermore, it explains the procedures OCR personnel should follow in 
investigating university athletic programs and provides consistency in 
enforcement.69 
In 1994, Congress passed the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, 
which requires educational institutions to disclose statistical information 
regarding the gender of athletes and general enrollment at universities 
and colleges?0 These annual reports are rather detailed in that they 
require the participating schools to report the number of full-time 
undergraduates, listing of all varsity teams, number of participants, 
operating expenses, coach salaries, money spent on athletically related 
student aid, ratio of student aid awarded between male and females, and 
total revenues from each sport. 71 This self-reporting is an essential 
element of OCR enforcement because it alleviates OCR of the burden of 
62. I d. at 76. 
63. I d. at 65. 
64. Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 23 
(1783)). 
65. I d. at 72. 
66. Id. at 76. 
67. Valerie M. Bonnette & Lamar Daniel, Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual I (1990) 
[hereinafter Investigator's Manual]. 
68. I d. at 1-2. 
69. Id. 
70. 20 U.S. C.§ 1092(g) (1994). 
71. Id. 
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acquiring these statistics by itself. 
More recently in the courtroom, eight of thirteen federal appellate 
courts have followed the established legal precedent of giving deference 
to reasonable regulations of administrative agencies and have sustained 
the legality of the three-part test. 72 The First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown 
University decided the most significant case in a series of opinions 
upholding the three-part test. 73 Due to budget cuts, in 1991, Brown 
University demoted two men's teams-water polo and golf-and two 
women's teams-gymnastics and volleyball-from university-funded to 
donor-funded varsity status.74 In Cohen I, female student-athletes sued 
Brown University claiming that Brown violated Title IX by demoting 
these two women's athletic teams. 75 The plaintiffs argued that "Brown's 
decision to devalue the two women's programs without first making 
sufficient reduction in men's activities or ... adding other women's 
teams to compensate for the loss"76 failed to effectively and fully 
accommodate the interests and abilities of the student body. 77 
The court's analysis relied heavily on the Policy Interpretation's 
three-prong test for compliance.78 To comply with Title IX, Brown had 
to satisfy one of the three prongs. 79 With regard to the first prong 
concerning substantial proportionality, the court stated that compliance 
with this prong creates "a safe harbor for those institutions that have 
distributed athletic opportunities in numbers 'substantially 
proportionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies."xo At 
the time of the suit, Brown's student body was approximately 52% male 
and 48% female while its athletic roster was 63.3% male and only 36.7% 
72. See Chalenor v. U. of N.D., 291 I' .3d 1042, 1046-48 (8th Cir. 2002); Pederson v. La. St. U., 
213 F.3d 858, 879 (5th Cir. 2000); Neal v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. St. U., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 
1999); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Assn., 43 F.3d 265, 277-75 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. Bd. of 
Trustees, U. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265,270 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Cohen I, 991 
F.2d 888; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 170, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo. St. Rd. of 
Agric., 998 F.2d 824,828 (lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of 
Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1993). 
73. Cohen v. Brown U., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992); affd, Cohen/, 991 F.2d 888; on remand 
to Cohen v. Brown U., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995); ajj'd in part, rev'd in part, Cohen II, 101 F.3d 
155. While this paper mentions all f(mr cases, the paper emphasizes the First Circuit opinions. For 
this reason, the First Circuit opinions are labeled Cohen I and Cohen II (for simplicity), even though 
one of the district court opinions precedes Cohen I and the second follows Cohen I and precedes 
Cohen II. 
74. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 892. 
75. !d. 
76. I d. at 893. 
77. Id. at 897. 
78. I d. at 896-98. 
79. I d. 
80. !d. at 897. 
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female.s 1 The court found that the student population and athletic 
composition were not substantially proportionate to each other and, 
therefore, Brown failed the first prong of the compliance test.s2 
Next, the court assessed whether Brown was in compliance with the 
second prong of the test.s3 Under this second option, Brown could 
comply with Title IX by showing "a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing 
interest and abilities" of the underrepresented gender.s 1 The First Circuit 
affirmed the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second 
prong of compliance.Ho The court held that although Brown's women's 
athletic programs developed significantly in the 1970s, the University did 
not continue this development in the 1980s and 1990s and therefore 
failed the second prong of the compliance test.x6 
The final prong of the compliance test is met by ensuring that the 
interests and abilities of the members of the underrepresented sex have 
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.87 
Again, the court concluded that there was enough interest and talent on 
the campus to support women's volleyball and gymnastics and therefore, 
by canceling these programs Brown failed the third prong by not fully 
and effectively accommodating the interests of female students at the 
University.ss Because Brown failed all three prongs of the compliance 
test, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction, 
which reinstated the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams.xY 
In 1996, the First Circuit faced these issues again in Cohen 1I.911 Upon 
remand from Cohen I, the district court had found Brown to be in 
violation of Title IX and ordered that Brown submit a comprehensive 
plan for complying with Title IX.Y 1 Brown's compliance plan was later 
rejected by the district court and the court ordered specific relief. 92 
Brown then appealed this order to the First Circuit.93 In Cohen II, Brown 
argued that "an athletics program equally accommodates both genders 
81. !d. at 892. 
82. !d. at 903. 
83. ld. at 897. 
84. !d. 
85. /d. at 903. 
86. !d. 
87. Jd. at 904. 
8R I d. 
89. /d. at 907. 
90. Cohen /1, 101 !'.3d at 155. 
91. ld. at 161. 
92. Id. at 162. 
93. /d. 
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and complies with Title IX if it accommodates the relative interests and 
abilities of its male and female students."94 The First Circuit rejected this 
comparative-level-of-interest argument because, in essence, Brown was 
stating that more males are interested in athletics than females. 95 The 
court found that Brown's reasoning was based on impermissible 
stereotypes, which "disadvantage [ d] women and undermine [ d] the 
remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting required program expansion 
for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level of relative interests."96 
The court went one step further and rejected statistical evidence assessing 
the level of women's interest in sports, noting that such evidence by itself 
cannot justify providing fewer athletic opportunities to women because it 
is "only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the 
basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."97 
Furthermore, such evidence was completely irrelevant in Brown's case 
because women's interest in sports was evident through the viable and 
successful women's varsity teams which were demoted.9H The First 
Circuit's decisions in Cohen I and Cohen II have shaped and defined the 
standard for Title IX compliance under the three-prong effective 
accommodation test. 
In the midst of the Cohen decisions, OCR recognized the confusion 
regarding the proper application of the three-part test of Title IX 
compliance and, in January 1996, issued a Clarification Memo which 
specifically elaborated on how to properly apply the test.99 The memo 
reiterates that for an institution to be in compliance with Title IX, that 
institution is required to satisfy only one prong of the three-prong test. 100 
The memo fully addresses each prong of compliance and sets forth 
examples illustrating proper and improper compliance with Title IX 
under each prong. 101 
First, the Clarification Memo addresses prong one-the substantial 
94. !d. at 174. 
95. I d. The court noted that Brown's relative interest approach reads the "full" out of the duty 
to accommodate "fully and effectively." Prong three requires "not merely some accommodation, but 
full and effective accommodation." Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Cohen I, 
991 F.2d at 898-99). After Cohen If's decision, the Ninth Circuit also rejected the notion that the 
third prong of the three-part test could be satisfied by merely "relative" rather than full 
accommodation. Neal, 198 F.3d at 768-70. 
96. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 174 (citing Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 209). 
97. Id. at 179-80. 
98. ld. at 180. 
99. Norma V. Cantu, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part 
Test 1 <http:/ /www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/claritlc.html>) (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 
Clarification Memo]. 
I 00. ld. at 2. 
101. ld.at4-12. 
155] MANIPULATING TITLE IX 167 
proportionality test. 102 The memo defines "participant" to include walk-
on athletes 103 and states that participation rates are based on an 
institution's full-time undergraduate enrollment as compared to the 
institution's intercollegiate athletic program. 104 Because this test uses a 
case-specific analysis, strict numerical proportions are not necessarily 
required under particular circumstances; this allows for natural 
fluctuations in enrollment and participation rates as well as situations 
when the number of additional athletic opportunities required to achieve 
substantial proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a viable 
team. 105 
Next, the memo discusses the second test-history and continuing 
practice.10" The memo clarifies that "developing interests include 
interests that already exist at the institution."107 Further, there are no 
fixed time intervals for compliance and no particular number of sports is 
dispositive. 108 However, the memo notes that DED "will not find a 
history ... of program expansion where an institution [only] increases 
the proportional participation . . . by reducing opportunities for the 
overrepresented sex .... "109 Nor will DED find compliance under this 
test when an institution "establishe[s] teams for the underrepresented sex 
only at the initiation of its program ... or [when an institution] merely 
promises to expand its program ... in the future." 110 The focus of test 
two is on program expansion that is responsive to the developing 
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. 111 
The Clarification Memo also discusses the third test-full and 
effective accommodation of the interests and abilities of the 
underrepresented sex. 112 The students whose interests must be evaluated 
are current and admitted students; the university is not required to 
102. I d. at 2. 
103. Id. at 5-6 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. at 75415) (Participants include individuals: "(a) who are 
receiving the institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to athletes competing at the 
institution ... ; and (b) who are participating in organized practice sessions and other team meetings 
and activities on a regular basis during a sport's season; and (c) who are listed on the eligibility or 
squad lists maintained for each sport, or (d) who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but 
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability."). 
104. I d. at 6. 
105. Id. at 6-7. 
106. Id. at 7. 
107. I d. 
108. I d. 
109. I d. at 8. 
110. I d. 
111. ld.at7. 
112. I d. at 9. 
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consider the interests of potential students. 113 High athletic participation 
of the overrepresented sex does not necessarily indicate that an 
institution is not in compliance with Title IX, as long as there is evidence 
that the "imbalance does not reflect discrimination .... "114 In this 
situation, the memo states that DED will consider whether "there is (a) 
unmet interest in particular sports; 115 (b) sufficient ability to sustain a 
team in the sport; 116 and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for 
the team." 117 
The Clarification Memo concludes by recapping that the three-part 
test provides an institution with flexibility for compliance.m The memo 
also clearly states that "nothing in the three-part test requires an 
institution to eliminate participation opportunities for men." 119 
IV. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION'S COMMISSION ON 
OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS 
In 2002, Title IX celebrated its thirtieth anniversary amidst the 
113. I d. at 9. 
114. Id.at9-JO. 
115. Id. at 10. Interes1 will be evaluated by numerous indicators such as: 
requests by students and admitted students that a particular sport be added; requests that an 
existing club sport be elevated to intercollegiate team status; participation in particular club or 
intramural sports; interviews with students, admitted students, coaches, administrators and 
others regarding interest in particular sports; results of questionnaires of students and admitted 
students regarding interests in particular sports; and participation in particular interscholastic 
sports by admitted students. 
Id. Interest can also be ascertained by looking at participation rates in high schools, amateur 
association, and community leagues. I d. Assessments of student interest should be straightforward, 
reach a wide audience of students, and be open-ended in sports towards which athletic interests can 
be expressed. I d. 
116. I d. at 11. The examination of indications of ability will include: 
the athletic experience and accomplishment-in interscholastic, club or intramural 
competition-of students and admitted students interested in playing the sport; opinions of 
coaches, administrators, and athletes at the institution regarding whether interested students 
and admitted students have the potential to sustain a varsity team; and if the team has 
previously competed at the club or intramural level, whether the competitive experience of the 
team indicates that it has the potential to sustain an intercollegiate team. 
Id. Most importantly, poor competitive record or inability to have teams play at the same level as 
other athletics programs is not conclusive evidence of lack of ability. I d. 
117. /d. Reasonable expectation will be determined by looking at competitive opportunities in 
the geographic area including "competitive opportunities offered by other schools against which the 
institution competes; and competitive opportunities offered by other schools in the institution's 
geographic area, including those offered by schools against which the institution does not now 
compete." Id. 
118. Id. at 11. 
119. Id. 
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growing debate over the effectiveness of Title IX's enforcement. 120 
College administrators claimed that OCR failed to provide clear guidance 
on how to comply with Title IX; interest groups alleged that OCR did not 
effectively enforce Title IX; and certain men's teams claimed reverse 
discrimination. 121 In June 2002, Secretary of Education Rodney Paige 
created the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics to respond to this 
growing public debate. 122 Secretary Paige charged the Commission to 
"collect information, analyze issues, and obtain broad public input 
directed at improving the application of current Federal standards."123 
After eight months of fact-finding, the Commission compiled its 
findings and recommendations for improving the enforcement of Title 
IX. 124 The Commission found that: (1) "great progress has been made 
120. Commission Report, supra n. 4, app. 3 at 46. 
121. Id. 
122. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at I. The structure of the Commission was composed of 
fifteen members appointed by the Secretary of Education from public and private sectors and three 
ex officio members from the OED. !d. app. 3, at 47. Ten of the fifteen commissioners were affiliated 
with NCAA Division 1-A athletics ranging from athletics directors, coaches, a division 
commissioner, and a University President. !d. app. 5, at 53-56. Eight of the fifteen members were 
women. Id. Among these women were impressive athletes, such as a former WNBA player, a two-
time Olympian, and a captain of the U.S. Women's National Soccer Team. /d. Ironically, no 
Commissioners represented Division II, Division lll, junior or community colleges, or high school 
athletic programs, even though the Commission's Charter specifically stated that "members shall 
include representatives of ... intercollegiate and secondary school athletes." !d. app. 3, at 47. 
123. !d. app. 3, at 46. Specifically, Secretary Paige charged the Commission to address seven 
key questions: 
(I) Are Title IX standards for assessing equal opportunity in athletics working to promote 
opportunities for male and female athletes? 
(2) Is there adequate Title IX guidance that enables colleges and school districts to know what is 
expected of them and to plan for an athletic program that effectively meets the needs and 
interests of their students? 
(3) Is further guidance or other steps needed at the junior and senior high school levels, where 
the availability or absence of opportunities will critically affect the prospective interests and 
abilities of student athletes when they reach college age' 
(4) How should activities[,! such as cheerleading or bowling[,! factor into the analysrs of 
equitable opportunities' 
(5) How do revenue producing and large-roster teams affect the provision of equ<~l athletic 
opportunities? The Department has heard from some parties that whereas some men athletes 
will "walk on" to intercollegiate teams-without athletic financial aid and without having been 
recruited-women rarely do this. ls this accurate and, if so, what are its implications for Title 
IX analysis? 
(6) In what ways do opportunities in other sport venues, such as the Olympics, professional 
leagues, and community recreation programs, interact with the obligations of colleges and 
school districts to provide equal athletic opportunity' What are the implications for Title lX' 
(7) Apart from Title IX enforcement, are there other efforts to promote athletic opportunities 
for male and female students that the Department might support, such as public-private 
partnerships to support the efforts of schools and colleges in this area' 
Commission Report, supra n. 4, app. 3 at 4H. 
124. /d. at I. 
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[under Title IX], but more needs to be done to create opportunities for 
women and girls and retain opportunities for boys and men;" 125 (2) many 
institutions feel that they must meet the first prong of the compliance 
test, the proportionality requirement, to ensure a "safe harbor," and this 
has been a factor in their decision to cut or cap men's teams; 126 (3) 
increasing operational costs have threatened compliance with Title IX; 127 
(4) there is great confusion about how Title IX requirements and 
enforcement can be strengthened; 128 and (5) artificial limits on walk-on 
opportunities do not benefit anyone. 129 
From these findings, the Commission set forth twenty- three 
recommendations, fifteen of which were approved unanimously by the 
Commission. 130 Most of the findings are rather benign in nature and 
merely call for clarity and consistency in Title IX enforcement by OCR. 
However, a handful of the recommendations, if adopted, would make it 
easier for schools to comply with Title IX by altering how institutions 
pass the three-prong test of compliance.131 As stated in the Commission's 
findings, most school and college administrators feel that their 
institutions must meet the proportionality test of the first prong to 
ensure compliance under Title IX. 132 Many of the Commission's 
recommendations directly cater to this pressure by making it easier for 
schools to enjoy the first prong's "safe harbor." 133 Two other 
recommendations target the third prong by allowing institutions to 
conduct interest surveys or use high school participation ratios as a 
means of demonstrating that an institution is fully and effectively 
accommodating the interests of the underrepresented gender. 134 The last 
recommendation by the Commission gives broad discretion to the 
Secretary of Education to change the existing three-prong test. 135 
After reviewing the Commission's recommendations, Secretary Paige 
stated that he "intend[ ed] to move forward only on those 
recommendations" that received unanimous support from the 
125. Id. at 21-22. 
126. !d. at 23-24. 
127. !d. at 25. 
128. !d. at 25-27. 
129. Jd. at 30-31. 
130. Jd.app.6,at59-60. 
131. See infra Part V. A, B. 
132. !d. at 23. 
133. See Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37-40, Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20 and an 
unnumbered proposal, specifically directed at proportionality ratios. 
134. See id. at 38-39, Recommendations 18 and 19. 
135. See id. at 36 and 40, Recommendations 12 and 23. 
155] MANIPULATING TITLE IX 171 
Commission. ur, As an administrative agency, DED is authorized to 
promulgate its own rules and regulations "without approval from 
Congress or the courts." 137 Therefore, after appropriate public notice and 
response, the Secretary of Education can use his own discretion to adopt 
and implement regulations under Title IX. 
V. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS DILUTE TITLE IX'S 
MANDATE OF PROHIBITING SEX DISCRIMINATION 
The Secretary of Education has broad discretion in implementing 
regulations concerning Title IX and, thus, could adopt Commission 
recommendations that reduce athletic opportunities and scholarship 
dollars to women and girls without approval from Congress or the 
courts.ux Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20, and an unnumbered 
recommendation, are targeted at lowering the standard for satisfying the 
substantial proportionality test. Through disingenuous counting 
requirements, these recommendations allow institutions to count relative 
compliance, not substantial proportionality; to count illusions of 
oppo tunities for women, not real opportunities; to not count actual 
opportunities given to men; to exclude non-traditional students from 
enrollment totals; and to reduce substantial proportionality to a 50:50 
ratio. As these recommendations would dilute the requirement of 
substantial proportionality at the cost of eliminating athletic 
opportunities, scholarships, and recruiting budgets entitled to women, 
they are inconsistent with Title IX and case law precedents. In addition, 
Recommendations 18 and 19 impermissibly condone interest surveys as 
a way for institutions to meet the third test of fully and effectively 
accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex, even though 
such interest surveys have already been rejected by the courts as a 
"measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for 
women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports." 139 
Recommendations 18 and 19 contradict case law precedents, as well as 
Title IX, by dismissing, rather than fully and effectively addressing, the 
interests of girls and women. Overall, these recommendations 
manipulate how institutions comply with Title IX at the expense of 
136. Sportslllustrated.com, Title IX Talk <http:/ /sportsillustrated.cnn.com/more/news/2003/ 
02/26/title_ix_ap> (accessed feb. 26, 2003). 
137. Marcia D. Greenberger, Co-Pres1dent, National Women's Law Center, Threats to Title IX 
and Sports Opportunities ji>r Women and Girls 2 <http://www.nwlc.org/display.din'section=athletics> 
(Mar.6,2003). 
13R. /d. 
139. Cohen II, I 0 I F.3d al 179. 
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women's athletic opportunities. In effect, these manipulations rationalize 
rather than eliminate sex discrimination. 
A. Recommendations Targeted at Manipulating the Numbers to Reach 
the "Safe Harbor" of the Proportionality Prong 
Although there are three ways to show compliance with Title IX as 
set forth in the 1979 Policy Interpretations, universities and schools are 
most interested in satisfying the first test of substantial proportionality, 
known as the "safe harbor" in Title IX compliance. 140 In other words, if a 
school's male/female ratio is substantially proportionate to the 
male/female athletic opportunities, then the school is per se in 
compliance with Title IX and no further investigation is required. 141 This 
numerical analysis relies on hard data, which is easier to understand than 
the other two more abstract tests. Athletic departments are pressured to 
meet this test because it ensures compliance with Title IX and decreases 
the likelihood of lawsuits and the withdrawal of federal funding. 142 This 
undue pressure to meet prong one of Title IX compliance most likely 
played a significant role m the Commission's findings and 
recommendations, given that many of the Commission's 
recommendations are directly targeted at diluting the substantial 
proportionality test, thereby making it easier for institutions to attain this 
"safe harbor." 143 
Recommendation 14 directly attacks the substantial proportionality 
requirement by suggesting that OCR allow for a reasonable variance in 
the relative ratios in order to comply with Title IX. 144 As reason for the 
change, the Commission asserts that, in practice, the courts and OCR 
have required strict proportionality rather than substantial 
proportionality. 145 This is clearly not true. The substantial 
proportionality standard first appeared in the 1979 Policy Interpretations 
and has been interpreted by the courts and OCR on many occasions, but 
never has it been interpreted to mean strict numerical proportions. 111' 
140. Cohen I, 991 f.2d at H97. 
141. ld.at898. 
142. Jd. 
143. Sec Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37-40, Recommendations 14, 15, 17, 20, and an 
unnumbered proposal. 
144. /d. at 37. 
145. !d. 
146. See Neal, 198 F. 3d at 763, 765, 768 (where court accepted a five percentage-point gap 
between female student ratio and female athlete ratio); Roberts, 998 F.2d at S29 (where the court 
noted that OCR does not require a "set ratio" but "that substantial proportionality entails a t;tirly 
close relationship between athletic participation and undergraduate enrollment" (citation omillcd)). 
See Clarification lvlenw, supra n. 99, at 6. 
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The courts interpret substantial proportionality on a case specific basis 
and seem unwilling to set clear demarcations on what constitutes 
substantial proportionality, noting that the standard should be flexible 
with regards to the circumstances of each particular institution. 147 
However, case law does give some indication as to what the courts 
consider to be substantial proportionality. In Roberts v. Colorado State 
Board of Agriculture,14H the Tenth Circuit found that the University's 
10.5% disparity between enrollment and athletic participation did not 
meet the substantial proportionality test. 149 The court also reviewed 
OCR's three-year compliance review of Colorado State, which found 
disparities of 7.5%, 12.5% and 12.7%, which also did not meet the test's 
requirements. 1511 The Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have addressed 
substantial proportionality, holding that 13%, 20% and 25%, respectively, 
did not satisfy substantial proportionality. 151 In Neal v. Board of Trustees 
of the California State Universities, 152 the Ninth Circuit found the 
University in violation of Title IX due to a 25% disparity in enrollment 
and athletic opportunities for women. 153 The initial lawsuit settled out of 
court, resulting in a consent decree mandating that the University 
implement and maintain a "proportion of female athletes that was within 
five percentage points of the proportion of female undergraduate 
students at [the] school." 154 Even though the courts do not subscribe to 
particular demarcations on what constitutes substantial proportionality, 
they are readily equipped to make these appropriate individualized 
147. Sec cases cited in note 146. In addition, arbitrary percentages of compliance can mean 
entirely different things to different institutions. for example, University A has a student body 
make-up of 52% males and 48% females. The University has one thousand students in its athletic 
program and the break down is 62% males and 38% females. This 10% disparity denies women one 
hundred athletic spots as compared to their overall enrollment. In contrast, University B has the 
same student body make-up, but they have only one hundred student athletes. If University B has a 
10% disparity in athletic participation it would only deny spots to ten women. Under the 
Clarification Memo, University B may be found to have obtained substantial proportionality because 
ten women may not be sufficient to support a viable team. Yet, University A would most likely not 
meet Title IX's substantial proportionality test because the one hundred women denied an athletic 
spot could easily be found to be sufficient to support a viable team(s). Therefore, it is apparent that 
substantial proportionality must be determined on a case specific basis. 
14K Roberts, 998 r.2d at H24. 
149. !d. at 829. 
I ~0. Id. at 830. 
151. Favia v. Ir1d. U. of Pa., 7 F.3d at 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993) (where student body was 56% 
female but athlete population would only be 43% female under university's plan); Pederson, 213 F.3d 
at 87H (where student population is 49% female but "the population participating in athletics is ... 
29% female"); Neal, l 98 r. 3d at 763, 765, 768 (where females comprised 64% of student population 
but only 39'Yr, of athlete population). 
152. Neal, !9R F.3d at 763. 
15.l. /d. at 765. 
154. Id. 
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determinations. 
Case law serves as a rough guideline for what may numerically 
constitute substantial proportionality; however, case law also 
demonstrates that the standard is flexible and that courts do allow for 
some variance. 155 As the above case law indicates, Recommendation 14, 
which garnished full consensus by the Commission, may be vulnerable to 
being overturned by the courts based on past precedent interpreting 
substantial proportionality more narrowly than the recommended 
reasonable variance. 156 
Further, OCR has stated that substantial proportionality should be 
determined through a flexible, case specific analysis. 157 OCR's 
Investigator's Manual instructs Title IX compliance investigators that 
"there is no set ratio that constitutes 'substantially proportionate' or that, 
when not met, results in a disparity or a violation." 15H The manual merely 
advises that there needs to be a fairly close relationship between the two 
ratios. 159 The 1996 OCR Clarification Memo specifically states that "it 
may be unreasonable to expect an institution to achieve exact 
proportionality" due to natural fluctuations in enrollment and 
participation rates. 160 In addition, the memo recognizes that substantial 
proportionality would occur "when the number of opportunities ... 
required to achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a 
viable team," 161 allowing some flexibility in the standard. Moreover, 
OCR explains that substantial proportionality is institution specific and 
such a determination is properly made on a case-by-case analysis and not 
through a statistical test. 162 
The Commission's recommendation to allow reasonable variance in 
substantial proportionality would unnecessarily find institutions to be in 
compliance with this test under Title IX without actually providing equal 
opportunities for women. 163 The adoption of such a recommendation 
155. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text. 
156. See id. 
!57. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6. 
158. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30 (citing Investigator's Manual, supra n. 67, at 24.). 
159. !d. at 830. 
160. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6. 
161. Id. at 7. 
162. I d. at 6. 
163. This recommendation is reported as having unanimous support by all Commissioners. 
However, two Commissioners, Donna de Varona and Julie Foudy, submitted a minority report 
clarifying that upon further review of the recommendation they withdrew their support due to the 
"damaging results that would not be consistent with Title IX." Donna de Varona & Julie Foudy, 
Minority Views on the Report of the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics 15 
<http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/MinorityReportfeb26.pdf>) (feb. 26, 2003) /hereinafter Minority 
Report]. 
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would change the current standard from a narrowly-construed, objective 
standard based on enrollment to an open-ended, subjective standard 
based on the Secretary of Education's judgment. 1M The broad language 
used by the Commission indicates that the Secretary of Education could 
make such determinations arbitrarily without considering case specific 
factors or circumstances-a notion rejected by both the courts and 
OCR. 165 Further, current interpretations by the courts and OCR have 
already built flexibility into the test, obviating the Commission's relative 
variance standard. 166 This new standard would result in a loss of 
opportunities for women in athletics because institutions would be given 
too much latitude in meeting the first prong of the Title IX test. 167 By 
lowering the standard, institutions would impermissibly be in the "safe 
harbor" of Title IX compliance with no incentive to provide equal 
participation opportunities to women, which is inconsistent with Title 
IX's purpose and mandate. 
Recommendations 15, 17, and 20 are also aimed at lowering the 
standard of compliance under the first prong and accomplish this goal 
through unique counting and mathematic manipulations. 168 
Recommendation 15 would allow substantial proportionality to be 
measured based on the ratio of the school's enrollment to a 
predetermined number of athletic participation slots allotted. 169 The 
Commission Report notes that this would allow a school to demonstrate 
available athletic opportunities "[e]ven if the slots a program makes 
available are not filled." 170 Again, the Commission is remiss in honoring 
Title IX's clear purpose--to provide equal opportunities to members of 
both sexes. This recommendation conflicts with clear case law precedent 
and current OCR practices. 171 
The courts have firmly recognized that athletic participation 
opportunities "must be real, not illusory." 172 In Williams v. School 
District of Bethlehem, 173 the plaintiffs sued the school district on behalf of 
their minor son, challenging the exclusion of their son from girls' field 
164. ld. 
165. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-30; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 6. 
166. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text. 
167. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15. 
168. See infra nn. 169-229 and accompanying text. 
169. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 37. 
170. ld. 
171. Williams, 998 f'.2d at 170; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 3. 
172. Clarijication Memo, supra n. 99, at 3. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 170; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 
167. 
173. Williams, 998 F.2d at 168. 
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hockey. 174 The Third Circuit's analysis focused on whether a male could 
be excluded from a single-sex female team. 175 The 1979 Policy 
Interpretations explain that a school must allow a member of the 
excluded sex to try out for a single-sex team only if the athletic 
opportunities of the excluded sex have previously been limited. 176 The 
district court focused on whether boys at Liberty High School were 
previously limited, 177 holding that the boys had been limited because girls 
had been able to try out for more teams than boys for two decades. 1n On 
appeal, the Third Circuit rejected this flawed analysis by stating: 
The mere opportunity to try out for a team ... is not determinative of the 
question of previously limited athletic opportunities under Title IX. 
Athletic Opportunities means real opportunities, not illusory ones. If, to 
satisfy [sic] Title IX, all that the School District [was] required to do was to 
allow girls to try out for boys' teams, then it need not have made efforts ... 
to equalize the numbers of sports teams offered for boys and girls.17Y 
Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and 
remanded for further fact-finding. 180 The court found that compliance 
with Title IX cannot be measured simply by comparing numbers, but 
instead found that the analysis should center on "the benefits, treatment, 
services, or opportunities afforded male and female athletes in the 
institution's program as a whole." 181 Because Recommendation IS's 
straw man slots conflict with case law stating that participation 
opportunities must be real, Recommendation 15 would most likely be 
rejected by the courts. 
Current OCR guidelines specifically prohibit institutions from 
counting unfilled slots because OCR "must consider actual benefits 
provided to real students." 182 Because, as already established, compliance 
under Title IX is not just merely satisfying numerical amounts, OCR 
considers the quality and kind of benefits actually provided to student 
athletes. 1R3 If only slots were counted, an institution could be found in 
compliance with Title IX without any actual students benefiting; such a 
practice would be insufficient for Title IX compliance under OCR's 
174. Id. at 170. 
175. ld. at 172. 
176. ld. 
177. ld. at 174. 
178. ld. 
179. Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180. ld. at 180. 
181. I d. at 176 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. at 71417). 
182. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 3. 
183. ld. 
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standards. 1x4 Again, Recommendation 15 is vulnerable to rejection not 
only by case law precedent, but also by current standards of enforcement. 
In addition to conflicting with case law and OCR's 1996 Clarification 
Memo, 1xs Recommendation 15 de facto modifies the safe harbor of 
substantial proportionality by diminishing real participation 
opportunities afforded to women, such as the allocation of funding. 1x6 
Currently, Division I colleges allocate 32% of their recruiting budgets to 
women's teams. 1x7 As a result of this recruiting disparity, fewer women 
than men receive athletic opportunities. Jxx Therefore, if an institution 
could set a predetermined, but unfilled, number of slots for its women's 
teams, it would be given credit for meeting Title IX compliance without 
giving women actual participation opportunities and without expending 
similar recruiting budgets. 1x9 
Overall, Recommendation 15 could change an institution's ability to 
comply with substantial proportionality. For example, a school could 
more easily find itself in Title IX's "safe harbor," giving the institution no 
incentive to address unequal recruiting treatment, and women would 
continue to be denied equal opportunities. 190 This recommendation is 
inconsistent with Title IX's purpose of eliminating sex discrimination in 
educational opportunities. 191 Title IX is not interested in illusions of 
equality for women, but rather mandates that there be actual equal 
opportunities for women in athletics. 1n The recommendation that 
allows unfilled slots to meet the requirements of Title IX condones 
pervasive discrimination and unequal treatment of women by 
manipulating the numbers without really addressing the underlying issue 
that women are not being given equal opportunities. 193 At the most, 
Recommendation 15 is a mirage of compliance with Title IX, and such 
illusions have been firmly rejected by the courts and OCR. 
Another recommendation directed towards manipulating actual 
participation opportunities is Recommendation 17, which excludes walk-
on athletes from athletic ratios. 194 In essence, this recommendation is the 
1S4. /d. 
ISS. See supra nn. 146-54 and accompanying text. 
1R6. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13. 




191. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
192. 20 U.S.C. §1681. In addition, courts that have interpreted Title IX have also expressed 
that opportunities must be real. Williams, 998 F.2d at I70 and Cohen II, IOI F.3d at 167. 
193. Minority Report, supra n. I63, at 13. 
I 94. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38. 
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inverse of Recommendation 15, allowing schools not to count athletic 
opportunities for men that the school actually provides. 1 95 In doing so, 
the deflated athletic rosters would be proportional to the student 
enrollment to satisfy the first compliance test. Based on the 
Commission's findings regarding walk-on athletes, "artificial limitations 
on the number of walk-ons may limit opportunities without any 
corresponding gain for the underrepresented sex." 196 Ironically, this 
conclusion is not based on any statistical analysis 197 and should be 
discredited in its entirety. The Commission further explained that roster 
management, a practice of limiting the number of men that can walk on 
to a team, controls the appearance of disproportional participation, but 
does not create any actual benefit to women. 19x In other words, 
unlimited walk-ons will not fix the underlying issue of disproportional 
participation of women, but instead only masks the problem. Therefore, 
it was illogical for the Commission to even recommend that walk-ons not 
be counted, when the Commission found that such a practice does not 
correspond to any benefit in disparate participation. 199 
To date, the courts have not been faced with the issue of how to hide 
walk-on athletes from an institution's overall athletics participation 
numbers. However, case law does indicate that intercollegiate athletics 
opportunities "should be measured by counting actual participants" 
without distinguishing between scholarship and walk-on athletes. 21111 The 
courts have recognized that team size can vary throughout the athletic 
season based on injuries, cuts, and quits. 201 Therefore, team roster 
participants should be determined at the end of the completed season 
and should acknowledge those members that played for a majority of the 
season, whether they are bench-warmers or core players. 202 Moreover, 
the courts have applied a common sense application: 
Where both the athlete and coach determine that there is a place on the 
team for a student, it is not for [the courts] to second-guess their 
195. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13. The Minority Report's Finding 17 implies that "men 
walk on more than women." /d. at 10. 
196. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38. 
197. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 30. The Commission's finding begins by stating, 
"[a]lthough no statistical analysis of this issue has been perf(Jrmed, there has been much testimony 
about the relative rates at which men and women walk on to teams." /d. 
198. !d. 
199. ld. 
200. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 167 (emphasis added) (quoting Cohen v. Brown U., 879 F. Supp. 185, 
202-03 (D.R.l. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
201. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192. 
202. !d. 
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judgment and impose its own, or anyone else's, definition of a valuable 
or genuine varsity experience. It is the nature of a team that each 
student makes a different contribution to the team's success and takes 
from it a unique experience. Every varsity member is therefore a varsity 
"participant."203 
179 
Because courts most likely count actual team players during the 
season, Recommendation 17 may face rejection by courts that do not 
distinguish between scholarship recipients and walk-on athletes in 
assessing substantial proportionality. In addition, the courts may 
consider that walk-on athletes receive the same benefits of sports 
participation as full or partial scholarship recipients and recruited walk-
ons.204 After all, the institution's resources are spread among all 
participants-whether "official" athletes or merely walk-ons. 
Importantly, the Commission found that male athletes are more 
likely to walk on to teams than female athletes.205 Therefore, 
Recommendation 17 specifically benefits male athletes rather than 
women because these walk-on male athletes, which are not counted in 
the institution's proportionality ratio, still receive the benefits of 
coaching, training, equipment, tutors, and uniforms.206 In fact, 
Recommendation 17 denies women necessary resources because the 
institution now has to shift money and resources away from funding 
women athletes in order to make up for the unreported male walk-ons.207 
The courts are at liberty to consider various factors in determining Title 
IX compliance and will most likely see through Recommendation 17's 
veil of compliance, recognizing that an athlete is a participant-whether 
recruited or not. 
Recommendation 17 could also have far-reaching, damaging effects 
on women who attend institutions where scholarships are not provided 
to athletes-high schools and Division III colleges.20x Under this 
recommendation, only full or partial scholarship athletes and recruited 
walk-ons count in the institution's proportionality ratio.209 In the case of 
Division lii colleges, only recruited walk-ons would be counted and the 
NCAA does not monitor contacts between coaches and prospective 
students at this level.210 Therefore, there would be no way to monitor or 
203. Jd. (emphasis added). 
204. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13. 
205. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 30-31. 
206. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 13-14. 
207. /d. 
208. /d. 
209. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38. 
210. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
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differentiate between recruited and non-recruited walk-on athletes, 
making it easier for a school to claim that their athletes are not recruited 
in order to comply with this recommendation.2ll This loophole would 
swallow Title IX in its entirety on Division III campuses. Overall, 
Recommendation 17 enables schools to pretend to comply with Title IX 
by not counting all athletic opportunities for men and reducing their 
obligation to female athletes. 212 
The most egregious manipulation by the Commission of the 
proportionality prong is Recommendation 20. This recommendation 
deflates the student enrollment numbers by excluding non-traditional 
students from the school's undergraduate population. 213 Conveniently, 
the Commission defines non-traditional students as those students not 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, and students of any age 
who have children.214 Data indicates that women outnumber men by 37 
percent as individuals over twenty-four enrolled in degree-granting 
institutions. 215 Therefore, Recommendation 20 looks neutral on its face, 
but in effect will disparately impact women athletes by excluding a large 
portion of women to be counted towards enrollment numbers. 216 Even 
though the Supreme Court has held that discriminatory effect is not 
sufficient to maintain a sex discrimination case,217 the Court has 
211. ld. 
212. ld. 
213. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39. 
214. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
215. Id. (citing U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 
<http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/digest200 l/tables/dt174.asp> ). 
216. An example illustrating this point may be more helpful in understanding the effects of 
Recommendation 20. At University A the undergraduate student population is 54% females and 
46% males, which is substantially proportionate to 54% women athletes and 46% male athletes. 
However, University A has a large number of non-traditional students as undergraduates. These 
students are then excluded from the overall student population. Since data indicates that women 
outnumber men as non-traditional students, more women are excluded from University A's student 
body population. Therefore, the newly configured student body population is 49% females and 51 '!1, 
males with corresponding athletic opportunities. Under Recommendation 20, women athletes at 
University A have the potential to lose 5% of their athletic opportunities merely by excluding non-
traditional students. Therefore, Recommendation 20 may look neutral on its face, but it has the 
potential of unfairly impacting women by denying them required athletic opportunities. 
217. Personnel Adminstr. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). Feeney challenged a 
Massachusetts civil service statute which gave an absolute hiring preference to any veteran who 
obtained a passing score on particular examination. At the time of the suit, 98 percent of veterans in 
Massachusetts were men, meaning that the law benefited males while detrimentally effecting females. 
The Court held that the statute was not intentionally gender-based and only purposeful 
discrimination against women would give rise to an equal protection violation. Moreover, the Court 
stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." ld. at 273. See 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 ( 1977) (holding that racially 
discriminatory intent or purpose must be motivating factor in order to strike down rezoning plan). 
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determined that discriminatory impact will be a factor in analyzing the 
underlying discriminatory purpose behind a law.218 As Recommendation 
20 is directed at weakening compliance under Title IX, it seems likely 
that the discriminatory impact of Recommendation 20, coupled with 
overall weakening of Title IX enforcement, may be sufficient to prove the 
discriminatory intent necessary to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Furthermore, "as applied" challenges could be used to show that the 
government has enforced a neutral-sounding provision in a way that 
discriminates against women, which would also be sufficient for mid-
level gender review under the Equal Protection Clause.219 
In addition, Recommendation 20's classification of students with 
children as "nontraditional" students is outright discrimination in and of 
itself. Furthermore, this classification can be seen as discrimination 
against women because female students are most readily identifiable with 
children. The impact of this recommendation would be to deflate the 
number of women enrolled and, thus, artificially inflate the proportion of 
women participating in athletics.220 Again, this disparate impact is a 
pretext to sex discrimination against women by excluding them from 
opportunities rightfully theirs under the proportionality test of Title 
IX.221 Further, there is no way to fairly implement this rule. 222 Would an 
institution be prepared to do background checks on all of its students to 
see who had mothered or fathered a child?223 The Commission clearly 
did not think this recommendation through very well. 
Two of the Commissioners released a Minority Report in which they 
articulated another objection to Recommendation 20. 224 The Minority 
Report explains that this recommendation is impermissibly based on 
stereotypes that students over a certain age or with children are not 
interested in participating in sports.225 The Supreme Court has been clear 
that it will strike down classifications based on faulty generalizations or 
stereotypes.226 The Minority Report concludes that "[t]his 
218. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976) (holding that discriminatory purpose must 
be proven to show racial discrimination that violates the equal protection clause and that 
disproportionate impact is a factor in ascertaining intent). 
219. See f.E.B. v. Ala., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (holding that intentional discrimination on 
basis of gender by state actors violates the equal protection clause). 
220. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
221. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71418. 
222. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
223. An institution may be surprised to find out that john Doe superstar quarterback is the 
father of three children. 
224. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
225. Id. at 14. 
226. See U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 533 {1996) (holding that generalizations about women no 
longer justify denying opportunities to women who have talent and capacity outside the average 
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recommendation would allow every school to presume, for purposes of 
Title IX, that all students who are over the age of twenty-four or who 
have children are uninterested in playing sports."227 Although 
Recommendation 20 merely seems to exclude non-traditional students 
from the overall enrolled-student-to-athlete ratio, it is unclear whether 
non-traditional students would also be excluded from participating in 
athletics altogether. Furthermore, Title IX requires consideration of the 
interests of an institution's students, traditional or non-traditional, in 
allocating athletic opportunities.nx If Recommendation 20 precludes this 
type of consideration, then it violates the clear intent of Title IX to 
establish equal protection under the law for all students.m Thus, 
Recommendation 20 is seriously flawed because ( 1) it will have a 
disparate impact on women athletes, (2) it is based on impermissible 
stereotypes, and (3) it violates the clear intent of equal protection under 
Title IX. 
The last recommendation aimed at meeting the standard of 
proportionality is an unnumbered proposal that received a tie vote from 
the Commissioners.230 This recommendation would permit institutions 
to allocate 50% of their participation opportunities to men and women 
respectively,231 but would also allow institutions a 2 to 3% variance in 
complying with the 50% ceiling.232 Since the recommendation received a 
tie vote, the Commission neither approved nor disapproved the 
recommendation, indicating that there are obvious concerns with the 
rule.233 The Commission Report notes that this recommendation would 
provide a more quantifiable goal for compliance while allowing flexibility 
due to uncontrolled changes in athletic programs. 234 
Even if this rule were to be adopted, it may not satisfy the 
proportionality prong to which it is directed. 235 For example, if a school 
has a student body population of 64% female to 36% male, a 50:50 
athletic roster would not be "substantially proportionate" as required 
under the first test of compliance.23" Furthermore, this rule sets a ceiling 
on participation and scholarship opportunities to both men and women, 
description). 
227. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 14. 
228. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71418. 
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 





235. Seegenerally44 Fed. Reg. at 71418. 
236. See supra nn. 140-62 and accompanying text. 
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no matter how large of a percentage they represent in their respective 
student body.237 In practice, an institution comprised of 60% male and 
40% female would probably never be willing to cap their men's teams and 
allow women to have more opportunities than required by their relative 
student body proportion. 
The Minority Report also notes that the 2 to 3% variance from the 
50% standard would in effect allow schools to impose a ceiling at 47% for 
women athletes. 23H This would result in a loss of opportunities to women 
and girls under the current law, given that women comprise 53% of 
student bodies at Division IA schools and 49% at high schools.239 The 2 
to 3% variance may set a lower-than-required ceiling, but at the same 
time it also sets a floor to athletic opportunities for women. Therefore, 
institutions could not slip below this 47% and athletic departments 
should be striving for 50:50 opportunities.240 Again, the Commission's 
apparent motive behind this recommendation was to give noncompliant 
institutions a way to manipulate the numerical data in order to be found 
in compliance.241 Consequently, this recommendation would result in 
the denial of athletic opportunities to women by allowing the 
continuance of on-going sexual discrimination in our nation's 
educational environments.242 
In conclusion, each of these recommendations appears to be targeted 
at lowering the substantial proportionality standard by manipulating 
how institutions count athletic opportunities. These manipulations 
reduce athletic opportunities for women and in effect mask the 
underlying issue-that sex discrimination still occurs in athletics today. 
These disingenuous counting methods rationalize and justify 
discrimination against women rather than prohibiting such sex 
discrimination. 
237. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 40. 
238. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15. 
239. Id. 
240. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 40. 
241. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 15. 
242. ld. 
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B. Recommendations Impermissibly Allowing Interest 
Surveys as a Means of Full and Effective Accommodation 
under the Third Compliance Prong 
[2004 
The third independent way to show compliance with Title IX is by 
demonstrating that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex 
have been fully and effectively accommodated.243 OCR's 1996 
Clarification Memo explains that there is a presumption that 
disproportionately high male participation rates may indicate that the 
institution is not providing equal athletic opportunities, but that an 
institution can rebut said presumption under test three by showing that 
the imbalance does not reflect discrimination.244 Such evidence must 
demonstrate that the institution has fully and effectively accommodated 
the interests of the underrepresented sex.245 OCR is to consider three 
factors when making its assessment under this test: "whether there is (a) 
unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to sustain a team 
in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of competition for the 
team."246 
The Secretary's Commission found that administrators were unsure 
how to assess student interest in athletics and were uncertain about the 
propriety of using interest surveys to measure student interests.247 The 
Commission found that institutions did not understand whether they 
had to exactly match these interest levels and whether they had to 
approve every request for a new women's team regardless of financial 
limitations. 248 Based on these findings, the Commission proposed 
Recommendations 18 and 19 to address any confusion under the third 
compliance test. 249 However, these two recommendations directly 
conflict with standing case law precedents and abruptly diverge from 
current OCR policies. 
Recommendation 18 inappropriately allows institutions to conduct 
interest surveys as a way of "(1) demonstrating compliance with the 
three-part test, (2) allowing schools to accurately predict and reflect 
men's and women's interest in athletics over time, and (3) stimulating 
student interest in varsity sports."250 The Commission noted that the 
criteria for such interest surveys should be guided by OCR and that this 
243. 44 fed. Reg. at 71418. 
244. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9-10. 
245. !d. 
246. !d. at I 0. 
247. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 26. 
248. Id. 
249. I d. at 38-39. 
250. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 38. 
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recommendation would allow institutions to have a quantifiable way to 
show compliance with the third test. 251 Interest surveys may provide 
quantifiable data, but the courts have specifically rejected the use of 
surveys in this regard. 252 In the Cohen cases, the First Circuit twice 
rejected Brown University's use of relative interest as a way to comply 
with full and effective accommodation. 253 In Cohen I, the court stated 
that Brown's interest surveys would "begin under circumstances where 
men's athletic teams have a considerable head start," which would not 
accurately measure the true interests of women.254 In Cohen II, the court 
more emphatically stated, 
[T]here exists the danger that, rather than providing a true measure 
of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect 
women's interest instead provides only a measure of the very 
discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of 
opportunity to participate in sports. . . . [T]o allow a numbers-based 
lack-of-interest defense to become the instrument of further 
discrimination against the underrepresented gender would pervert the 
remedial purpose of Title IX. We conclude that, even if it can be 
empirically demonstrated that ... women have less interest in sports than 
do men, such evidence, standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer 
athletics opportunities for women than for men. Furthermore, such 
evidence is completely irrelevant where ... viable and successful women's 
varsity teams have been demoted or eliminated. 255 
Cohen's rejection of interest surveys has been followed in other 
circuits.256 For example, in Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic 
Association, the Sixth Circuit cautioned that reliance on interest may be 
gender-neutral, but "it is a method which has great potential for 
perpetuating gender-based discrimination."257 
Thus, Recommendation 18 is inherently flawed for many reasons. 
First, as mentioned above, interest surveys have been rejected by the 
courts as a way of perpetuating sex discrimination.25x Second, interest 
surveys in essence force women to prove their interest in athletics before 
being given their right to equal opportunity to play under the law.259 
251. Jd. 
252. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179-80. 
253. Jd. 
254. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900. 
255. Cohen II, 101 F .3d at 179-80. 
256. Neal, 198 F.3d at 768; Horner, 43 F.3d at 273. 
257. Horner, 43 F.3d at 273. 
258. See supra nn. 250-55 and accompanying text. 
259. Minority Report, supra n. 169, at 16. 
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Third, interest surveys are based on the notion that women are not as 
likely to be interested in athletics.260 This notion rests on impermissible 
stereotypes, which have been unequivocally rejected by the Supreme 
Court.261 Fourth, evidence indicates that women are not any less 
interested in athletics than men when the doors of opportunity are 
open.262 Prior to Title IX's enactment, women's participation totaled 
300,000 in high school sports and fewer than 32,000 in intercollegiate 
athletics. Today there are 2.8 million girls participating in high school 
athletics and approximately 170,000 women in college sports. 263 Title IX 
has opened the door for women to demonstrate their interest in athletics; 
interest surveys, as suggested in Recommendation 18, would only close 
the door of discrimination on women again. 
While not as egregious as Recommendation 18, Recommendation 19 
also relies on potential interest surveys to assess interest. 
Recommendation 19 would allow institutions to demonstrate 
compliance with the third test by utilizing ratios of male/female athletic 
participation in the surrounding area or surveys of prospective or 
enrolled students' interest. 264 Again, the only justification for such a 
recommendation is that the Commission notes that this approach would 
allow institutions to quantify compliance.265 
There are several problems with Recommendation 19. First, while 
quantifiable data is easy to administer, on-going sex discrimination is not 
so easily quantified. The third test is not designed to be an easy numbers 
game; rather it is intended to be more abstract and flexible in addressing 
sex discrimination against women.266 
Second, this recommendation is very ambiguous in what it permits. 
Recommendation 19 could be read to allow interest surveys to be used to 
demonstrate the abilities and interest of the underrepresented sex. 267 But, 
as stated above, interest surveys would only perpetuate sex 
discrimination.26x This recommendation could also be read to allow 
"relative" accommodation based on trends, rather than the requisite full 
and effective accommodation.269 However, relative accommodation has 
260. Id. 
261. Sec supra n. 226 and accompanying text. 
262. Minority Report, supra n. 169, at 17. 
263. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 2. 
264. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39. 
265. Id. 
266. 44 Fed. Reg. al41718; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9. 
267. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 17. 
268. See supra nn. 250-55 and accompanying text. 
269. Minority Report, supra n. 163, at 17. 
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been specifically rejected by appellate courts, holding that comparative 
levels of interest rests on the overgeneralization that men are more 
interested in athletics than women. 270 This impermissible stereotype has 
disadvantaged women and undermined the remedial purpose of Title IX 
by limiting required program expansion for the underrepresented sex to 
the status quo level of relative interest.271 
Third, Recommendation 19 would permit institutions to compare 
their participation rates with the participation rates of the region, state, 
nation, or national governing body.272 Title IX, however, is institution 
specific, requiring institutions to provide equal athletic opportunities to 
its students.273 The third test requires institutions to demonstrate that the 
interests and abilities of its students have been fully and effectively 
accommodated, not whether outside third-party interests have been 
accommodated. 274 OCR's Clarification Memo explains that "the [1979] 
Policy Interpretation does not require an institution to accommodate the 
interests and abilities of potential students."275 Using other schools or 
states as a standard is inappropriate because it violates the purpose of 
Title IX. The courts and OCR have set forth adequate guidance on how 
the tr ird test of compliance should be administered, and these current 
practices should remain intact. 
In summary, Recommendations 18 and 19 impermissibly condone 
interest surveys as a way for institutions to meet the third test of fully and 
effectively accommodating the interests of the underrepresented sex. 
Interest surveys have been rejected by the courts as a "measure of the 
very discrimination that is and has been the basis for women's lack of 
opportunity to participate in sports."276 Recommendations 18 and 19, 
therefore, contradict case law precedents and Title IX by dismissing, 
rather than fully and effectively addressing, the interests of girls and 
women. 
270. Neal, 198 !'.3d at 768-70; Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 898-99. The Cohen 1 court noted that 
Brown's relative interest approach reads the "full" out of the duty to accommodate "fully and 
effectively." Prong three requires "not merely some accommodation, but full and effective 
accommodation." Cohen/, 991 F.2d at 989. 
271. Cohen I/, 101 !'.3d at 174 (citing Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 209). 
272. Commission Report, supra n. 4, at 39. 
273. 44 Fed. Reg. at 41718. 
274. 44 l'ed. Reg. at 41718; Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 9. 
275. Clarijlcation Memo, supra n. 99, at 9. 
276. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179. 
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VI. CONCLUSION -CURRENT TITLE IX POLICIES EFFECT! VEL Y 
PROMOTE BOTH MEN's AND WOMEN's ATHLETICS 
[2004 
Title IX has been cited as the "most successful civil rights statute in 
history."277 Through Title IX implementation and enforcement, 
opportunities for women to participate in athletics have substantially 
increased, while at the same time men's participation has increased as 
well.m Currently, 150,916 college women and 2.78 million high school 
girls participate in competitive athletics and 208,408 college men and 
3.92 million high school boys participate in athletics.279 Even though 
Title IX has leveled the playing field somewhat for women and girls, 
there still is much to be done to achieve equality. 280 Women still lag in 
participation opportunities, scholarship dollars, budgets, and other 
aspects of sports programming.281 Therefore, although complete equality 
has not been achieved, Title IX is working in its current form and current 
Title IX policies effectively promote both men's and women's 
participation opportunities equally. 
Under Title IX's current policies, institutions can comply with 
athletic participation in one of three ways.282 This flexibility allows 
institutions a choice in which test they choose to employ to comply with 
Title IX.283 In addition, none of these three standards requires schools to 
cut teams and each test can be achieved by expanding opportunities for 
the underrepresented sex.284 Seven out of ten adults familiar with Title IX 
think that Title IX should be strengthened or left alone.285 Myles Brand, 
277. Joanna Grossman, The Future of Title IX. The Federal Statute Concerning Gender Equality 
in Athletics: Can it Survive the Secretary of Education's Planned Revisions? <http:/ /writ.findlaw.com/ 
grossman/2003031l.html> (Mar. 11, 2003). 
278. NWLC Battle, supra n. 2, at 5. 
279. Id. at 2. 
280. Id. at 17. 
281. National Women's Law Center, Quick Facts on Women and Girls in Athletics 
<http://www.nwlc.org/display.cfm?section=athletics> (June, 2002). There are 2.78 million girls that 
participate in high school athletics as compared to 3.92 million boys. In college, 150,916 women 
compete compared to 208,408 men. Id. In college, women receive only 43% of all athletic 
scholarships dollars. In Divisions I and II women received at least $133 million less in scholarship 
dollars than men. Id. Women's scholarships totaled $372 million while men's totaled $505 million 
per year. I d. Women only receive 36% of operating budgets and 32% of recruiting dollars. Jd. In 
2000 for Division I institutions, for every dollar spent on women's sports, almost two dollars were 
spent on men's sports. I d. 
282. See supra nn. 78-88 and accompanying text. 
283. Clarification Memo, supra n. 99, at 2. 
284. Id. at II. 
285. Erik Brady, Poll: Most Adults Want Title IX Law Left Alone, USA Today, 
<http:/ /www.usatoday.com/ sports/ college/other/2003-01-07 -title-ix_x.htm> (last updated Jan. 7, 
2003). 
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President of the NCAA, has also opposed any changes to Title IX stating, 
"Title IX needs to remain in place in its current form in order to achieve 
full gender equity."286 Brand also states that he would only support those 
recommendations that make it easier to enforce Title IX.287 
The Commission on Opportunity in Athletics' findings and 
recommendations should be carefully reviewed and many of the 
recommendations should be rejected in their entirety. 
Recommendations that manipulate compliance under Title IX only 
rationalize discrimination against women. Thus, instead of weakening 
polices under Title IX, the DED is correct in focusing on educating 
institutions and the public on the importance of Title IX and the need to 
keep striving to achieve sexual equality. 288 Further, the DED has 
reaffirmed its commitment to Title IX and has stated that "it will 
aggressively enforce Title IX standards, including implementing 
sanctions for institutions that do not comply."289 
Equal opportunity for girls and boys and women and men is crucial 
to our nation and Title IX promotes this equality in educational 
settings.290 The opportunity to participate in athletics reaches beyond the 
playing field into increased health, self-confidence, academic 
performance, and leadership skills.291 Thus, to further equality in the 
educational setting and to achieve such desirable attributes as mentioned 
above, Title IX must be preserved and enforced in its current form for 
school athletics to be truly "open to all." 
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